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Abstract
Studies suggest that frontal alpha asymmetry is closely linked to psychological
adjustment following stressful experiences, such that more left-sided frontal activa-
tion during symptom provocation might predict lower levels of posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Here, we tested whether frontal asymmetry at rest and during expo-
sure to neutral, positive, negative, and trauma-related images would be associated
with PTSD, and particularly with characteristic reexperiencing symptoms. Symptoms
were assessed in trauma victims with (n5 24) and without PTSD (n5 15), using
both retrospective measures and 1-week ambulatory assessments with a diary and a
smartphone. While resting frontal asymmetry was unrelated to all retrospective meas-
ures, left-sided activation in response to the negative picture correlated with lower
levels of psychopathology. Left-sided activation in the trauma-related picture condi-
tion was more specifically associated with less emotionally intense intrusions and
responses to viewing the picture, even when corrected for other symptoms of psycho-
pathology. These effects tended to increase when participants with possible
overreporting tendencies were removed from the analyses. Moreover, trauma victims
without PTSD (i.e., relatively more resilient individuals) displayed higher left-sided
frontal activation in response to the negative picture, also when compared with a third
group of healthy, trauma-free individuals (n5 15). Our findings suggest that state-
dependent changes in frontal asymmetry could serve as a biological marker of PTSD
symptoms and could eventually be used for diagnostic purposes or as a target for
neuromodulation interventions. Future studies should establish whether this marker
can serve as an early predictor of psychopathology in recently traumatized
individuals.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
A small, yet nontrivial proportion of individuals who have
experienced aversive life events develop trauma-related psy-
chopathology, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
These trauma victims suffer from severe reexperiencing
symptoms (e.g., intrusions, nightmares), avoidance of cues
related to the trauma, altered mood and cognition, as well as
exaggerated general arousal and reactivity (American Psychi-
atric Association, 2013). Since the diagnosis of PTSD essen-
tially depends on self-report (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008) and
its symptoms are only modestly related to objective trauma
severity (Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000; Kessler, Son-
nega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; McNally &
Psychophysiology. 2018;55:e12779.
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Robinaugh, 2011), researchers and clinicians have been
searching for biological markers of psychological adjustment
to stress and trauma. The present study focused on so-called
frontal asymmetry as a potential biological indicator of PTSD
symptoms following trauma exposure.
Frontal asymmetry is a widely studied EEG biomarker
that refers to a hemispheric difference in alpha band power
(typically 8–13 Hz) above the frontal cortex (right minus
left). Given alpha’s inverse relationship with brain activity
(e.g., Pfurtscheller, Stancak, & Neuper, 1996), more positive
asymmetry scores are conventionally interpreted as reflecting
more left-sided frontal brain activity (Coan & Allen, 2004).
Measured across several minutes in resting individuals, this
marker has been shown to possess high internal consistency,
as well as good test-retest reliabilities (Towers & Allen,
2009). For decades, evidence has been accumulating to sug-
gest that more left-sided frontal activity is associated with
stronger approach motivation (e.g., Tomarken, Davidson,
Wheeler, & Doss, 1992), behavioral activation (e.g.,
Quaedflieg, Meyer, Smulders, & Smeets, 2015; Wacker,
Chavanon, Leue, & Stemmler, 2008), enhanced affect and
stress regulation (e.g., Koslov, Mendes, Pajtas, & Pizzagalli,
2011), psychological well-being (e.g., Urry et al., 2004), as
well as with fewer symptoms of mood and anxiety disorders
(Thibodeau, Jorgensen, & Kim, 2006). Based on these find-
ings (for reviews, see Coan & Allen, 2004; Harmon-Jones,
Gable, & Peterson, 2010), frontal asymmetry has long been
regarded as a promising indicator of psychological resilience
and (inversely) vulnerability to develop psychopathology.
Despite these promising indications, the frontal asymme-
try literature is inconsistent. For example, several studies
failed to replicate the relationship between frontal asymmetry
at rest with depression (e.g., Bruder et al., 1997; Reid, Duke,
& Allen, 1998). Moreover, for PTSD, resting state frontal
asymmetry has only little or even no predictive value across
studies (for review, see Meyer, Smeets et al., 2015). In part,
these inconsistencies might be due to methodological differ-
ences affecting the sensitivity and reliability of the EEG mea-
surement (e.g., length of recording and reference scheme; see
Allen, Coan, & Nazarian, 2004; Allen & Reznik, 2015;
Hagemann, 2004; Hagemann, Naumann, Thayer, & Bartus-
sek, 2002). However, there also is an emerging consensus
that frontal asymmetry has no ubiquitous and straightforward
association with mental health outcomes (Allen & Reznik,
2015; Coan, Allen, & McKnight, 2006; Meyer, Smeets
et al., 2015), for two major reasons. First and most impor-
tantly, the associations with motivational or mental health
outcomes appear to depend on the affective-motivational
context during which frontal asymmetry is measured (Coan
et al., 2006). For instance, several studies (e.g., Stewart,
Coan, Towers, & Allen, 2011, 2014) have found that rela-
tively lower left-sided activation in response to emotional
challenges, but not left-sided activity at rest, predicted cur-
rent or past levels of depression (for review, see Allen &
Reznik, 2015). Similarly, for PTSD, Rabe and colleagues
found an association between left-sided activation in
response to viewing a trauma-related picture and fewer
PTSD symptoms (Rabe, Beauducel, Z€ollner, Maercker, &
Karl, 2006; Rabe, Z€ollner, Beauducel, Maercker, & Karl,
2008). Thus, in line with a so-called capability model of
frontal asymmetry (see Coan et al., 2006), changes in frontal
asymmetry that correlate with affective-motivational states
appear to be associated with mental health outcomes, and
more robustly so than frontal asymmetry at rest.
Second, a frequent limitation in psychiatric research
examining biomarkers like frontal asymmetry is that studies
have focused on patient groups defined by their diagnostic
status rather than their predominant symptoms (Nusslock,
Walden, & Harmon-Jones, 2015; Schmidt, 2015). This argu-
ment is especially relevant to PTSD, since this syndrome
comprises fear, mood, and general distress-related symptoms
that are shared with other mood and anxiety disorders
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Forbes et al.,
2012; Zoellner, Pruitt, Farach, & Jun, 2014). Following the
view that frontal asymmetry is closely linked to state and
trait motivational direction (Nusslock et al., 2015), associa-
tions can thus be expected with mood and fear-related PTSD
symptoms that are characterized by deficient approach and
exaggerated withdrawal motivation, respectively.
Meanwhile, motivational direction may play only a
limited role in PTSD reexperiencing symptoms, including
dissociative amnesia and flashback memories, that are
thought to be unique in PTSD (Brewin, 2011; Bryant,
O’Donnell, Creamer, McFarlane, & Silove, 2011) and may
depend on specific memory functions that make traumatic
memories more or less accessible (e.g., Bisby, King,
Brewin, Burgess, & Curran, 2010; Meyer et al., 2013).
Moreover, it has been proposed that anxious arousal is
associated with relatively higher right parietal activation,
whereas anxious apprehension would be associated with fron-
tal asymmetry (Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997;
Nitschke, Heller, Palmieri, & Miller, 1999). Accordingly, fron-
tal asymmetry might not display specific relationships with
PTSD symptoms related to hyperarousal (e.g., the emotional
intensity of traumatic memories, sweating, tachycardia; Rubin,
Boals, & Berntsen, 2008), whereas associations with
cognitive-emotional reactions to the activation of traumatic
memories can be expected (including exaggerated negative
mood responses, and strong negative appraisal and rumination;
Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Notably, these factors are believed to
perpetuate and maintain PTSD symptoms in trauma victims
(Clohessy & Ehlers, 1999).
Based on these considerations, the present study aimed
to further investigate the association of frontal asymmetry
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with PTSD symptoms. We had a particular interest in explor-
ing possible associations with reexperiencing symptoms and
exaggerated emotional and cognitive reactions to the activa-
tion of trauma memories, which are relatively understudied
components of this disorder (Brewin, 2015; see also Meyer,
Otgaar, & Smeets, 2015). For this purpose, we recruited
trauma victims with PTSD and trauma victims without
PTSD, and assessed PTSD symptoms with questionnaires,
next to symptoms of depression, anxiety, and general psy-
chopathology. Since ambulatory measurements might cap-
ture reexperiencing symptoms more accurately than
retrospective scales (for a review, see Chun, 2016), we used
diaries and smartphones to assess the occurrence of intrusive
memories and how people reacted to them. In addition, we
included a self-report scale to assess the tendency to overre-
port symptoms, which may obscure associations between
frontal asymmetry and symptoms, particularly in analyses
that rely on retrospection (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003). In
line with Rabe, Beauducel et al. (2006), frontal asymmetry
was measured at rest, as well as in an emotion provocation
task during which participants viewed a neutral, a negative, a
positive, and a trauma-related picture. This setup made it
possible to contrast emotional conditions varying in valence
(negative, positive) and idiosyncratic meaning (trauma-
related, unrelated) with the neutral condition, which was
intended as a baseline. Furthermore, the task allowed us to
assess subjective responses to viewing the trauma-related
image (i.e., emotional intensity, rumination, experience of a
physical reaction, and distress).
Our basic hypothesis was that relatively more left-sided
frontal activity would be associated with fewer PTSD symp-
toms. Based on prior frontal asymmetry studies in PTSD
(Meyer, Smeets et al., 2015; Rabe, Beauducel et al., 2006;
Rabe et al., 2008), we explored this hypothesis for resting
frontal asymmetry and for activation asymmetry in response
to emotional provocation, expecting that asymmetry in the
trauma-related and negative conditions would be the best
predictors of PTSD symptoms. Since reexperiencing symp-
toms are thought to be specific to PTSD, we expected that
potential associations with emotional and cognitive reactions
to intrusions and to viewing the trauma-related picture would
remain significant when corrected for symptoms of other dis-
orders and for symptom overreporting tendencies. Finally,
for the purpose of group-level analyses, we also recruited a
comparison group of healthy participants who had never
been exposed to psychological trauma. Based on prior find-
ings by Rabe, Beauducel et al. (2006), we expected stronger
left-sided activation in response to viewing the trauma
picture in trauma-exposed participants without PTSD (i.e.,
relatively more resilient individuals), and weaker left-sided
activation in participants with PTSD (i.e., nonresilient indi-
viduals), as compared with nontrauma-exposed controls.
2 | METHOD
2.1 | Participants
Forty trauma survivors and 15 healthy participants without
trauma exposure enrolled in this study. An overview of the
different types of trauma and their frequencies, as well as
demographic information and sample characteristics, can be
found in the first two tables in the following sections. All par-
ticipants were required to be aged between 18 and 60 years,
be proficient in Dutch, and have normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Trauma survivors were recruited via advertise-
ments and among trauma victims seeking treatment at local
psychiatric outpatient clinics (RIAGG Maastricht and Aca-
demic Anxiety Center Mondriaan/PsyQ in Maastricht, The
Netherlands). For these participants, an inclusion criterion
was the presence of a potentially traumatic experience (i.e.,
criterion A1 for PTSD according to the DSM-IV; American
Psychiatric Association, 2000), as established using a Struc-
tured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV for Axis-I disorders
(SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). The pres-
ence of a PTSD diagnosis was neither an inclusion nor an
exclusion criterion. However, participants who had previ-
ously been diagnosed with PTSD and who had recovered
(e.g., following treatment for PTSD) were excluded. Also, we
excluded participants with traumatic experiences that referred
to an extended time period (e.g., childhood abuse lasting sev-
eral years) rather than distinct episodes, because our emotion
provocation task required the identification of a distinct trau-
matic memory that could be activated with a single picture
stimulus. Furthermore, the following exclusion criteria were
employed: (a) traumatic experiences in the past 6 months, (b)
current psychotherapy, (c) current or lifetime diagnosis of
psychotic or bipolar disorder, (d) current substance abuse or
addiction, (e) psychoactive medication unless medication had
been stable for 3 months, and (f) a history of head injury or
neurological problems (e.g., epilepsy). Healthy participants
without trauma exposure were required to be free of any trau-
matic experiences, and, in addition to the above-mentioned
exclusion criteria, had to be free of any current Axis-I disor-
der according to the DSM-IV, as established during a Mini-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan
et al., 1998). All participants provided written informed con-
sent. This study was approved by the standing ethical com-
mittee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience,
Maastricht University, The Netherlands.
2.1.1 | Recruitment and diagnostic
procedures
To recruit eligible trauma survivors, we screened potential
participants who were identified by the intake staff at local
psychiatric outpatient clinics and respondents to the
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advertisements. Candidates were initially screened for inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria by telephone, whereby biographi-
cal data, a short description and approximate date of
traumatic experiences, reasons for past or present psycholog-
ical, psychiatric, or medical treatments, medication, as well
as the frequency of tobacco, alcohol, and drug use were
obtained. During this interview, participants were also com-
prehensively informed about all parts of this study. For can-
didates who reported at least one traumatic experience,
eligibility for participation was further based on a SCID-I
(First et al., 2002), which was administered during an indi-
vidual diagnostic session by the intake staff at the psychiatric
outpatient clinics, or by Master or PhD level psychology stu-
dents who had previously received an extensive SCID train-
ing. Next to recording the presence of Axis-I disorders, this
interview was used to verify the presence of a traumatic
experience according to the PTSD criterion A1 in the DSM-
IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000),1 and to record
trauma type and frequency, as well as the time passed since
the traumatic experience(s).
Among 196 candidates who were referred from the psy-
chiatric clinics, reasons for exclusion were index traumatic
experiences that did not fulfill DSM-IV criteria or referred to
an extended traumatic period (n5 49), not fulfilling the age
criterion (n5 37), current psychotherapy (n5 37), diagnosed
substance abuse or addiction (n5 18), PTSD in remission
(n5 5), neurological or medical problems (n5 4), and lack-
ing proficiency in Dutch (n5 2). Finally, 23 declined their
participation or discontinued the contact, leaving 21 who
enrolled in the trauma survivor groups.
In addition, at least 133 individuals responded to the
advertisements, 76 indicating the presence of a possible trau-
matic experience (a small part of these data was lost and is
excluded from these statistics). Among this latter group, rea-
sons for exclusion were index traumatic experiences that did
not fulfill DSM-IV criteria or referred to an extended trau-
matic period (n5 10), the age criterion (n5 9), neurological
or medical problems (n5 5), psychotic or bipolar disorders
(n5 2), substance abuse (n5 1), and lacking proficiency in
Dutch (n5 1). Finally, 29 declined their participation or dis-
continued the contact, leaving 19 who enrolled in this study.
Potential participants who did not report a traumatic
experience were considered for participation if they could be
matched to one of the trauma-exposed participants in terms
of gender, age (difference< 4 years), and highest completed
education level according to the Dutch system (lower sec-
ondary, upper secondary, postsecondary, or higher educa-
tion). They were invited to a telephone interview with the
MINI (Sheehan et al., 1998) to establish eligibility for the
healthy nontrauma-exposed group.
2.1.2 | Diagnostic groups
For group analyses, we divided the trauma survivors into those
with a PTSD diagnosis and those without, based on the SCID-
I outcomes. One participant diagnosed with PTSD endorsed a
considerable number of items on the Structured Inventory of
Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; total score5 27;> 3 SD
higher than the sample mean; cf. Table 2), while performing
below-chance level on a visual search task (a contextual cueing
paradigm with nonemotional search displays; Meyer et al.,
2013; data not included here) despite repeated instructions
(accuracies below the 50% chance level in 23/30 blocks). As
this response pattern is indicative of deliberate symptom over-
reporting and task underperformance, this particular participant
was removed from all analyses. Among the remaining partici-
pants diagnosed with PTSD (n5 24), some also had diagnoses
of a current mood (n5 11) and/or anxiety disorder (n5 7),
somatoform disorder (n5 3), eating disorder (n5 1), ADHD
(n5 1), a mood disorder in partial or complete remission
(n5 5), and/or an eating disorder in remission (n5 2). Among
the trauma survivors without PTSD (i.e., a relatively more
resilient subgroup; n5 15), some also were diagnosed with a
mood disorder (n5 1), anxiety disorder (n5 3), or an anxiety
disorder in remission (n5 1).
2.1.3 | Incomplete data
One participant diagnosed with PTSD did not return for the sec-
ond session, and one participant in the healthy control group
terminated participation prematurely. These two individuals
were excluded from correlational analyses regarding symptoms
of psychopathology. However, we retained their EEG and
response data for group-level analyses. Data from two question-
naires (BDI-II and SIMS) from one other participant (healthy
control participant) were missing, as were the data from one
questionnaire (SIMS) of one trauma victim with PTSD.
2.2 | Trauma-related symptoms
2.2.1 | Retrospective assessment
We used the PTSD Checklist Civilian version (PCL; Blanchard,
Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). It consists of 17
items that require the respondent to indicate the frequency of
experiencing DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) symptoms of PTSD in the past month on 5-point scales
(15 not at all, 55 extremely). The sum score (a5 .95) serves
as a total PTSD severity score. In parallel, we used the self-
reported PTSD Symptom Scale (PSS-SR; Foa, Riggs, Dancu,
1As can be seen in Table 1, the large majority of included participants
also fulfilled criteria A1 of the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013).
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& Rothbaum, 1993), which consists of four reexperiencing
items (a5 .87), seven avoidance items (a5 .85), and six
hyperarousal items, (a5 .84; total score a5 .93).
As a self-report measure of cognitive and affective
responses to the occurrence of intrusions, we used the
Response to Intrusions Questionnaire (RIQ) developed by
Clohessy and Ehlers (1999) and adapted in Dutch by Smets,
Wessel, Schreurs, and Raes (2012). It consists of two sub-
scales, whereby the first assesses the frequency of ruminating
about the content of intrusions on eight items (e.g., “I dwell
on how the event could have been prevented”; a5 .81),
requiring responses on a 4-point scale (15 never, 45 all the
time). The second subscale measures negative appraisals of
intrusions (e.g., “The fact that I experience intrusions means
that I am going crazy”; 6 items; a5 .81), on 7-point scales
(15 strongly disagree, 75 strongly agree). Responses are
summed to provide scores for each subscale.
2.2.2 | Ambulatory assessment—intrusion
diary
We measured the occurrence of intrusions, defined as sud-
den, involuntary memories of traumatic experiences, and
affective reactions to intrusions during a period of 7 days
using a pen-and-paper diary. Similar to the diary method
often used in experimental analogue studies (see Holmes,
Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; Meyer et al., 2013), the diary
had two parts. The first consisted of a structured page for
each day in which participants noted the occurrence of intru-
sions, next to the time of waking up and going to bed, and
the overall level of stress experienced during the day (not
counting stress caused by the intrusions) on a scale from 0
(not stressful) to 100 (extremely stressful). There also was
free space left for notes about any experiences of the day
that were out of the normal range (optional). Participants
were instructed to fill out the diary whenever an intrusion
occurred, and at least twice a day. In the second part of the
diary, participants were asked to provide details about each
intrusion that they had recorded. In particular, they were
asked to write down the content and trigger of the intrusion
(to verify that the memory was involuntary and trauma
related), and whether it was primarily based on images,
thoughts, or both. Furthermore, they were asked how dis-
tressing the intrusion was, how intense the elicited emotions
were, and whether they had any physical reaction associated
with it (e.g., laughing, sweating, tachycardia), all rated on
scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
For our analyses, we computed the number of intrusions
with an image component and those with a thought compo-
nent, as well as the total frequency of intrusions. Frequency
scores were logarithm-transformed prior to the analyses to
correct for their strongly skewed distribution (i.e., ln [11 #
intrusions]). Distress, intensity, and physical reaction scores
were averaged across all recorded intrusions for the analyses
(zero was entered when no intrusion had occurred).
2.2.3 | Ambulatory assessment—smartphone
Complementary to the diary, we provided participants with a
smartphone that was used to measure the degree to which intru-
sions changed affect levels referenced to baseline over a 7-day
period. In order to measure baseline affect levels, participants
received five messages throughout each day and were prompted
to fill out an affect grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989);
an item consisting of a single 9 3 9 grid, whereby respondents
had to select a single field that best reflected their current level
of valence on the horizontal axis (range: 15 unpleasant feel-
ings, 95 pleasant feelings) and arousal on the vertical axis
(range: 15 sleepiness, 95 high arousal). The timing of the
messages was tailored to the typical waking hours of each par-
ticipant, such that the first and last messages were sent between
30 and 90 min after the time of getting up, and between 90 and
30 min before going to sleep, respectively. The remaining three
messages were equally distributed throughout the day with6
30-min random variation.
Whenever participants experienced an intrusion, they
were asked to indicate this via the smartphone by following
TABLE 1 Frequency of different trauma types and






Affective Picture System #)
Witness 10 3016, 3060, 3216, 6313,
6315, 9410, 9903
Death of a close
onea
7 2053, 3216, 3225,
3230, 6570, 9911
Threat of violence 6 6313, 6315, 6321,
6560, 6561
Rape 5 6313, 6315, 6560
Physical abuse 4 3181, 6313, 6315
Armed robbery 4 6313, 6321, 6370
Other life-threatening 3 1726, 6321, 9903
Control group 15 2053, 3016, 3216, 6313,
6315, 6321, 6370, 6560,
6561, 9903
aWhile fulfilling criterion A1 for trauma exposure according to the DSM-IV, it
is unclear for a minority (n5 3) whether they also fulfill DSM-V criteria for
trauma exposure (i.e., death may not have been violent or accidental).
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a link that was provided to them. For ethical reasons, we
explicitly allowed our participants to omit reporting an intru-
sion via the smartphone if this would be experienced as too
stressful, or when the intrusion occurred at night (e.g., wak-
ing up from a nightmare). Upon following the link, they
were prompted to fill out an affect grid. After 15 and 30 min,
they received two follow-up messages with another affect
grid. At the same time, all baseline measurements were sup-
pressed for a period of 3 h.
For the analyses, we calculated the mean valence and
arousal levels across all weekly baseline measurements per
participant. Moreover, we averaged the valence and arousal
levels following an intrusion, separately for the immediate,
115 min, and the 130 min timings. Finally, we derived
valence and arousal reactivity scores for each timing by sub-
tracting the weekly baseline from the values at each timing.
Higher reactivity scores reflect relatively increased valence
and arousal in response to intrusions.
2.3 | Resting state EEG measurement
In line with the procedure described in Tomarken, Davidson,
Wheeler, and Kinney (1992), the resting state EEGmeasurement
consisted of eight 1-min blocks with a fixed interval of 20 s
between blocks. In half of the blocks, participants were instructed
to keep their eyes open and look straight ahead at a fixation cross,
and in the other half participants had to keep their eyes closed.
The beginning of each block was signaled by a single tone, and
the end by a double tone. The order of open- and closed-eyes con-
ditionswas randomized for each participant, whereby each condi-
tion could not occur more than twice consecutively.
2.4 | Emotion provocation task
We employed an emotion provocation task similar to the one
described previously by Rabe, Beauducel et al. (2006). This
task consisted of four 2-min blocks, during which participants
TABLE 2 Symptoms of PTSD, anxiety, depression, and overall psychopathology in the current sample








n 24 15 15
% Female 75.0 66.7 93.3 v2(2)5 3.28
Age 30.7 (9.9) 35.0 (10.3) 28.9 (8.7) F(2,51)5 1.58
Handedness (EHI) 76.6 (36.6) 44.1 (80.5) 80.0 (28.7) F(2,51)5 2.39
PANAS–PA state 27.5 (7.7) 32.0 (7.6) 28.1 (7.2) F(2,51)5 1.77
PANAS–NA state 20.2 (8.3) 13.5 (6.4) 11.5 (1.6) F(2,51)5 9.54*** .010 >.99
Months since index trauma 76.4 (74.1) 78.7 (37.0) – t(37)520.1
PCL score 48.1 (10.3) 29.8 (13.3) 19.4 (2.3) F(2,49)5 38.96*** <.001 .022
PSS-SR total score 24.2 (8.7) 9.5 (7.2) 2.6 (2.3) F(2,49)5 44.70*** <.001 .033
Reexperiencing 5.7 (2.9) 2.2 (2.4) 0.6 (1.0) F(2,49)5 21.59*** <.001 .26
Avoidance 8.3 (4.9) 2.4 (2.7) 0.5 (1.2) F(2,49)5 22.93*** <.001 .51
Hyperarousal 10.2 (3.5) 4.9 (3.0) 1.4 (1.4) F(2,49)5 42.18*** <.001 .006
STAI-T 54.3 (8.9) 38.6 (13.2) 32.8 (4.7) F(2,49)5 25.62*** <.001 .32
BDI-II 23.3 (9.5) 8.3 (9.3) 2.1 (3.4) F(2,48)5 30.69*** <.001 .16
BSI score 1.27 (0.59) 0.56 (0.61) 0.16 (0.14) F(2,49)5 21.53*** <.001 .12
SIMS total score 10.8 (5.1) 6.1 (4.4) 3.2 (2.6) F(2,47)5 13.03*** .007 .29
Low intelligence 1.0 (0.8) 0.8 (0.9) 0.5 (1.0) F(2,47)5 1.15
Psychosis 0.5 (0.7) 0.3 (0.5) 0.4 (0.7) F(2,47)5 0.54
Note. Standard deviations of the mean and degrees of freedom for the statistical tests appear in parentheses. EHI5Edinburgh Handedness Inventory; PANAS5
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PA5 Positive Affect; NA5Negative Affect; PCL5PTSD Checklist (Civilian version); PSS-SR5 PTSD Symptom
Scale–Self-Report; STAI5 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II5Beck Depression Inventory II; BSI5Brief Symptom Inventory; SIMS5 Structured Inventory of
Malingered Symptomatology.
***p< .001.
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viewed a still image from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Between
the blocks, a 30-s break was inserted. The stimuli consisted of
one neutral (a spoon; IAPS #7004), one positive (two bunnies;
IAPS #1750), one negative (a barking pit bull; IAPS #1300),
and one individually chosen trauma-related image. The order
of the first three blocks was randomized, while all participants
viewed the trauma-related image last.
Table 1 lists the IAPS pictures that were chosen as the
individualized trauma-related image for the emotion provo-
cation task. Following the trauma-related image, participants
were asked to indicate the degree to which the image
reminded them of their own traumatic experience on an 11-
point scale (05 not at all, 105 very much). Moreover, using
three similar 11-point scales, they indicated how much the
picture made them ruminate, how intense the emotions were
if they had been reliving the traumatic experience, and
whether they noticed an associated physical reaction (e.g.,
laughing, sweating, tachycardia).
2.5 | Physiological recordings and data
reduction
In line with published guidelines (Keil et al., 2014; Pivik
et al., 1993), we measured EEG using an electrode cap with
Ag/AgCl electrodes positioned according to the International
10-20 system (American Electroencephalographic Society,
1994) at the locations FZ, F3, F4, F7, F8, FC3, FC4, CZ,
C3, C4, T7, T8, PZ, P3, P4, P7, P8, PO3, PO4, PO7, PO8,
and A2. By means of a BrainAmp EEG amplifier (Brain
Products GmbH, Germany), signals were sampled continu-
ously at 250 Hz, referenced online to the left mastoid (A1),
band-pass filtered (0.1–35 Hz), and stored. An electrode at
AFz served as signal ground. In addition, electrooculogram
(EOG) electrodes were applied above and below the right
eye and at the outer canthi of both eyes to measure vertical
and horizontal eye movements. All electrode impedances
were kept below 5 kOhm with homologous scalp electrodes
being within 1 kOhm of each other.
2.5.1 | Resting state frontal asymmetry
In line with prior frontal asymmetry studies (for a review,
see Allen et al., 2004; Meyer et al., 2014b; Quaedflieg et al.,
2015), frontal asymmetry scores were determined according
to the following data reduction procedure (BrainVision Ana-
lyzer 2.0 software; Brain Products, Germany). First, all EEG
data were rereferenced offline to the average of A1 and A2
and band-pass filtered from 1 to 30 Hz. Next, each 1-min
block from the resting state measurement was divided in 2-s
epochs (75% overlap). Epochs were defined as artifact conta-
minated (e.g., by eye movement or muscle activity) and
removed when vertical EOG or EEG activity exceeded thresh-
olds of6 200 and6 75 lV, respectively. On average, 70.5%
(range5 12–100; SD5 21.2) of eyes-open and 97.8%
(range5 82–100; SD5 3.8) of eyes-closed epochs were arti-
fact free. Then, we derived the power density for each
retained epoch using fast Fourier transform (FFT) with a
100% Hanning window and calculated weighted averages
across artifact-free epochs, separately for the eyes-open and
eyes-closed conditions.
Following the procedure described in Quaedflieg et al.
(2015), we determined frontal asymmetry scores based on
each participant’s individual alpha peak frequency (IAF). In
contrast to relying on the standard alpha band (e.g., 8–13
Hz), this approach takes the large interindividual variability
in IAF into account and thereby increases the signal-to-noise
ratio. IAF was defined as the dominant frequency rhythm
between 5 and 15 Hz at the midline posterior electrode (Pz)
on the weighted average of the 4 min of resting eyes-closed
data (see Doppelmayr, Klimesch, Pachinger, & Ripper,
1998; Klimesch, 1999). The sample average IAF was 9.81
Hz (range: 7.3–12.2, SD5 0.97). The IAF bandwidth was
defined as the 20% range above and below the IAF (i.e., on
average from 7.85–11.77 Hz), largely overlapping with the
standard alpha band between 8 and 13 Hz. Alpha asymmetry
scores were calculated by subtracting the log-transformed
alpha power density values at left from right frontal electro-
des (i.e., ln[right]2 ln[left]), and then averaged across eyes-
open and eyes-closed blocks.
The analyses concentrate on alpha power asymmetry in
the widely used lateral frontal (F8, F7), midfrontal (F4, F3),
and midline frontocentral leads (FC4, FC3). Each of these
electrode pairs has been used in prior studies (cf. Gordon,
Palmer, & Cooper, 2010; Rabe, Beauducel et al., 2006; Wah-
beh & Oken, 2013) to determine frontal asymmetry in PTSD
samples (for review, see Meyer, Smeets et al., 2015). Because
we had identical hypotheses for each of these sites, we calcu-
lated a composite frontal asymmetry index (i.e., the mean of
ln[F8], ln[F4], ln[FC4]2mean of ln[F7], ln[F3], ln[FC3]), in
order to reduce the number of statistical analyses and conse-
quently the probability of Type I errors. Using this metric, we
found high to excellent internal consistency across the eight
resting state blocks (a5 .89) and across the four emotion
induction blocks (a5 .86).2 To examine whether the asymme-
try effects were specific to frontal sites, we calculated a similar
asymmetry index for parietal sites (mean of ln[P8], ln[P4]2
mean of ln[P7], [P3]).
2For asymmetry scores that are derived from power density in the stand-
ard alpha band (8–13 Hz), we found almost identical internal consisten-
cies (resting: a5 .89, induction: a5 .88). Moreover, we repeated the
main correlation analyses reported in Table 4 with these scores, finding
basically the same results (see online supporting information Table S2).
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2.5.2 | Frontal activation asymmetry during
emotion provocation
In the same manner as for the resting state measurements,
average power densities were calculated for the four 2-min
blocks of the emotion provocation task. On average, for the
2-min blocks (237 epochs) with neutral, positive, negative,
and reminder pictures, we retained respectively 63.6%
(SD5 27.6), 60.3% (SD5 28.2), 64.2% (SD5 27.5), and
59.0% (SD5 27.5) of the epochs after artifact rejection.
These percentages did not vary as a function of group, or
Group 3 Phase, all ps> .21. For the purpose of correlational
analyses, we calculated activation asymmetry scores (similar
to Rabe, Beauducel et al., 2006) by subtracting each individ-
ual’s resting state frontal asymmetry from the asymmetry
scores during each of the emotion induction blocks (for
details on this decision, see Results).
2.6 | Self-report scales to control for
individual differences
2.6.1 | Common symptoms of
psychopathology
To check for the specificity of potential findings to trauma-related
symptoms, we used the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Boulet &
Boss, 1991) as an overall measure of psychopathology. It consists
of 53 items that describe a variety of psychological complaints and
require respondents to indicate the degree of distress caused by
them on 5-point scales ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely).
For our analyses, we used the mean score across all items
(a5 .98). Moreover, the trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) and the revised Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)
were employed to measure stable individual differences in anxi-
ety and depression levels, respectively. The STAI consists of
two 20-item subscales that tap into state and trait anxiety, using
4-point scales (range: 1–4). The BDI-II consists of 21 items that
screen for depression and are rated on 4-point scales (range 0–3).
The sum scores of the two scales were used to quantify trait anxi-
ety (a5 .96) and depression (a5 .92), respectively.
2.6.2 | Symptom validity
To assess symptom overreporting tendencies, the Structured
Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; Merckel-
bach & Smith, 2003; Smith & Burger, 1997), consisting of
75 true-false statements, was used. The statements represent
rare or atypical symptoms of different clinical conditions,
namely, low intelligence, affective disorders, neurological
impairment, psychosis, and amnesia. One low intelligence
item was removed from the scoring because the correct
answer changed in the course of the study (“Beatrix is the
Queen of the Netherlands”). Most commonly, the SIMS is
used as a tool to detect malingering by means of cut-off
scores. When used as a dimensional measure, studies have
shown that nonextreme scores are positively related to genu-
ine levels of psychopathology (e.g., Dandachi-FitzGerald,
Ponds, Peters, & Merckelbach, 2011). Therefore, next to
using the total SIMS score (a5 .82), we also used the low
intelligence subscale (e.g., “I am unable to count from 20 to
1 without making a mistake”) and the psychosis subscale
(e.g., “When I hear voices, it feels as if my teeth were leav-
ing my mouth”), both of which have no conceptual overlap
with the variables of interest in our study and have been
shown to discriminate well between honest and feigning
responders (Dandachi-FitzGerald et al., 2011). Both sub-
scales had very low internal consistencies (psychosis:
a5 .11; low intelligence a5 .07), which is likely due to the
presence of zero-variance items (items that none of the par-
ticipants endorsed), and which is in line with the view that
these scales capture item-unspecific response tendencies
rather than an underlying psychological construct.
2.6.3 | Handedness and current mood
We included the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI;
Oldfield, 1971) to determine motor lateralization (i.e., hand-
edness). Finally, we included a measure of current mood
prior to the resting state measurement, using the State version
of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Wat-
son, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This scale consists of two 10-
item subscales with adjectives, respectively describing posi-
tive affect (e.g., interested; a5 .87) and negative affect (e.g.,
distressed; a5 .94), and requiring responses on 5-point Lik-
ert scales (15 very slightly or not at all; 55 extremely).
Items on each scale are summed, and higher scores indicate
higher current positive and negative affect, respectively.
2.7 | Procedure
2.7.1 | Session 1
Trauma-exposed participants were invited to two individual
lab sessions, separated by an interval of 8 days. The first ses-
sion was scheduled in the afternoon in order to reduce possi-
ble diurnal fluctuations in frontal asymmetry (Velo, Stewart,
Hasler, Towers, & Allen, 2012). Participants were instructed
beforehand to refrain from drugs and alcohol for 24 h, and
from heavy physical activities, smoking, or drinking coffee
immediately prior to participation. Upon arrival, they were
seated in an electrically shielded and soundproof cabin and
were given a word learning task (data not included here).
Next, the EOG and EEG electrodes were prepared, while par-
ticipants filled out questionnaires (including biographical data,
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EHI) on the computer. Following electrode preparation, the
participants were left alone in the cabin and were given the
trauma screening form and a form asking about typical wak-
ing hours (in order to program the diary app). When they had
completed them, the experimenter checked the responses and
briefly discussed the trauma screening form with the partici-
pant in order to select a trauma-relevant picture for the
reminder task. Then, participants performed a recall test from
the word learning task. Participants were later shown the raw
EEG and EOG signals to demonstrate common sources of
artifacts (e.g., body and eye movements), filled out the
PANAS, and underwent the resting state measurement. After-
ward, they performed an unrelated, nonemotional visual
search task lasting approximately 30 min, followed by the
emotion provocation task. Finally, they were given the smart-
phone and the diary that they were to complete for 7 days
(starting the day after Session 1) and received extensive writ-
ten and verbal instruction on their use. Moreover, they were
given a demonstration with the smartphone of how to report
an intrusion and fill out the affect grids.
2.7.2 | Session 2
One week later, participants returned the smartphone and the
diary, and the experimenter checked the diary for correct use
and readability together with the participant. This was fol-
lowed by administration of a questionnaire battery on the
computer that included the PCL, PSS-SR, RIQ, BSI, STAI,
BDI-II, and the SIMS. Finally, the participants were fully
debriefed and received 75e as a compensation for their
participation.
2.7.3 | Healthy control group
The healthy controls were invited to a single laboratory ses-
sion. The procedure was similar to the first session of the
trauma-exposed group, except that these participants were
given the same questionnaire battery that trauma-exposed
participants completed in Session 2 immediately following
the emotion induction task. No ambulatory diary measures
were taken in this group. These participants received 30e to
compensate them for participating.
2.8 | Statistical analyses
Single extreme values in resting and emotion provocation
EEG asymmetries were replaced such that their deviance
from the sample mean equated 2.5 times the sample SD (i.e.,
Winsorizing; Rivest, 1994). We used analysis of variance
(ANOVA) and t tests to test differences between the diagnos-
tic groups in our sample. Our main analyses address the rela-
tionship between frontal asymmetry and PTSD symptoms
using Pearson product-moment correlations and partial corre-
lation analyses. Furthermore, we used repeated measures
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to test whether PTSD
symptoms modulated frontal asymmetry scores and vice
versa. When sphericity assumptions for ANCOVA were vio-
lated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p values are reported
along with the respective epsilon and uncorrected degrees of
freedom. Alpha was set at .05 (two-tailed). Where applicable,
follow-up pairwise comparisons were performed, and in
those cases we consistently report Bonferroni-corrected p
values. In the correlation analyses, we corrected alpha for
multiple testing. For an optimal balance between the risk of
Type I and Type II errors, we used the Bonferroni tool from
Simple Interactive Statistical Analysis (SISA; www.quantita-
tiveskills.com/sisa/calculations/bonfer.htm), which takes the
average correlation among dependent variables into account.
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Sample characteristics
3.1.1 | Retrospective symptom assessment
Symptoms of PTSD, anxiety, depression, and overall psy-
chopathology are summarized in Table 2. There were no
group differences in age, gender ratio, handedness, and time
since the index trauma among trauma-exposed participants.
While there were no group differences in state positive affect
in Session 1, we did find group differences in state negative
affect. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants diag-
nosed with PTSD had higher negative affect levels prior to
the EEG resting state measurement than the other two
groups, ps .01, whereas the no-PTSD group did not differ
from healthy controls, p> .99.
The analyses further confirm the allocation of partici-
pants into three groups, with higher PCL total scores in par-
ticipants with PTSD compared with trauma-exposed
participants without PTSD (pairwise p< .001), who had
higher scores than healthy controls, p5 .022. Similarly, pair-
wise comparisons indicated that the PTSD group scored
higher on PSS-SR reexperiencing and avoidance symptoms
than the two other groups, ps< .001, while there was no dif-
ference between trauma-exposed participants without PTSD
and healthy controls, ps> .26. For PSS-SR hyperarousal
symptoms, pairwise comparisons indicate significant differ-
ences between all groups, ps< .01, with highest scores in the
PTSD group and lowest in the healthy controls. For the
STAI-T, BDI-II, and BSI scores, but also for the SIMS total
scores, significantly higher scores were found in the PTSD
group compared to the other two groups, all ps< .01, while
there were no differences between trauma-exposed partici-
pants without PTSD and healthy controls, all ps> .11.
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Importantly, however, no group differences emerged for the
SIMS psychosis and low intelligence subscales.
Finally, significant group differences also emerged on
the RIQ rumination subscale, F(2,49)5 7.59, p5 .001,
h2p 5 .24, and on the RIQ negative appraisal subscale,
F5 19.33, p< .001, h2p 5 .44. PTSD patients had higher
rumination scores (M5 19.7, SD5 4.2) than controls
(M5 13.8, SD5 3.5), p5 .001, while the no-PTSD group
(M5 16.7, SD5 5.8) did not differ significantly from the
other groups, ps> .15. Furthermore, participants with PTSD
scored higher on negative appraisal of intrusions (M5 18.6,
SD5 3.4) compared to the no-PTSD group (M5 13.5,
SD5 3.3) and to controls (M5 13.0, SD5 2.0), ps <.001,
with no difference between no-PTSD and control partici-
pants, p> .99.
3.1.2 | Ambulatory assessment
Table 3 summarizes the intrusions recorded in the diary by
the trauma-exposed participants, separately for those diag-
nosed with and without PTSD. As could be expected, partici-
pants with PTSD reported more intrusions than trauma-
exposed participants without PTSD, irrespective of whether
the intrusions had an image or a thought component, all ts
(df5 36) >.2.94, ps< .01. The former group also reported
higher levels of distress (t5 3.14, p5 .006), emotional inten-
sity (t5 2.52, p5 .020), and physical reactions to the intru-
sions (t5 2.27, p5 .033). Moreover, participants with PTSD
tended to report lower mean sleep quality (t522.03,
p5 .050) and higher levels of diurnal stress unrelated to the
intrusions (t5 2.93, p5 .006).
In all trauma-exposed participants, the (log-transformed)
frequency of intrusions in the diary corresponded with the
number of intrusions that were recorded in parallel via the
smartphone, r(38)5 .54, p< .001. In total, 27 of the 38
trauma-exposed participants (18 diagnosed with PTSD)
reported at least one intrusion using the smartphone and
filled out the corresponding affect grids. Among this sub-
group, PTSD symptoms tended to correlate with lower
weekly valence scores (PCL score r5 -.36, p5 .064; PSS-
SR total r5 -.39, p5 .047), but not with arousal scores
(largest r5 -.26, p5 19). Valence and arousal scores did not
differ significantly between those diagnosed with and with-
out PTSD, all ts(25)< 0.89, ps> .38.
In order to assess possible interactions of PTSD symp-
toms with the time course of valence scores, we performed a
repeated measures ANCOVA for all trauma-exposed partici-
pants (irrespective of their diagnostic status) with time (3:
immediate, 115 min, 130 min) as within-subject factor and
mean weekly valence level and PCL total score as covariates.
This revealed that the factor time interacted both with PCL
scores, F(2,48)5 4.56, e5 .64, p5 .033, h2p 5 .16, and with
weekly valence levels, F(2,48)5 4.17, e5 .64, p< .041,
h2p 5 .15. A similar interaction of time with PTSD symptoms
emerged when PSS-SR scores were entered instead of PCL
scores, F(2,48)5 5.18, e5 .66, p5 .022, h2p 5 .18. More-
over, it also emerged at trend level in a repeated measures
ANOVA, where we entered diagnostic group instead of con-
tinuous PTSD symptoms (2: PTSD, no-PTSD) as between-
subjects factor, F(2,50)5 2.95, e5 .64, p< .086, h2p 5 .11.
The nature of this interaction can be seen in Figure 1.
Valence reactivity scores differed between the diagnostic
groups only immediately following an intrusion, t(25)52
2.3, p5 .030, but not 15 or 30 min later, all ps> .12. Mean-
while, similar ANCOVAs for arousal levels did not reveal
any significant main or interaction effects involving time (all
ps> .09) or PTSD symptoms (all ps> .37). Only mean
weekly arousal levels tended to be associated with arousal
levels following an intrusion, F(1,24)5 3.69, p5 .067,
h2p 5 .13.
3.1.3 | Emotion provocation task
Subjective responses to the trauma-related picture during the
emotion provocation task are summarized in Figure 2.
ANOVAs comparing the three groups revealed significant
TABLE 3 Intrusion diary responses
Method PTSD (n5 23) No-PTSD (n5 15)
Diary intrusions Total 6.22 (5.14) 2.40 (3.04)
Image-based 4.13 (4.17) 1.33 (1.40)
Thought-based 4.87 (4.12) 2.07 (3.08)
Affective responses Distress 70.1 (15.7) 39.1 (36.2)
Intensity 65.2 (20.4) 19.6 (35.9)
Physical reaction 51.1 (24.1) 27.4 (35.4)
Diurnal characteristics Sleep quality 60.6 (14.1) 71.3 (18.2)
Diurnal stress level 47.7 (13.0) 33.8 (16.1)
Note. Standard deviations of the mean appear in parentheses.
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group differences on all five included items, Fs(2,51)> 7.47,
ps .001, h2ps> .22. Importantly, pairwise comparisons
revealed that trauma-exposed individuals with and without
PTSD similarly indicated that the picture reminded them of
their own traumatic experience, p5 .33, and both groups
scored significantly higher than the trauma-free controls, both
ps< .001. Furthermore, both trauma-exposed groups tended
to score higher on all other items compared to the trauma-free
control group, all ps .05, while the scores did not differ
between participants with and without PTSD, all ps> .28.
3.2 | Frontal asymmetry
3.2.1 | Group differences
Mean frontal asymmetry scores per group are displayed in Fig-
ure 3. At first, we ran a 5 (Phase: resting, neutral, positive, neg-
ative, trauma-related)3 3 (Group: PTSD, no-PTSD, controls)
repeated measures ANOVA on frontal asymmetry scores.
This revealed a significant Phase 3 Group interaction, F
(8,204)5 2.62, p5 .010, h2p 5 .09, as well as a group main
effect, F(2,51)5 6.00, p5 .005, h2p 5 .19, in the absence of a
main effect for phase, F(4,204)5 1.20, p5 .31, h2p 5 .02. To
explore the nature of the Phase 3 Group interaction, we ran
follow-up ANOVAs per phase, yielding a significant group
effect during the resting state phase, F(2,51)5 10.91,
p< .001, h2p 5 .30. Here, frontal asymmetry scores did not dif-
fer between the two trauma-exposed groups, p5 .29, but,
unexpectedly, both of these groups had more left-sided activ-
ity compared to the healthy control group (ps< .004).
In contrast, different patterns emerged in the emotion
provocation task. We found significant group effects for neu-
tral and negative picture viewing, F(2,51)5 3.84, p5 .028,
h2p 5 .13, and F5 8.46, p5 .001, h
2
p 5 .25, respectively. In
these two conditions, trauma-exposed participants without
PTSD (i.e., relatively more resilient individuals) had higher
left-sided activity than participants with PTSD, ps< .024,
and, in the negative picture condition, they also had higher
scores than control participants, p5 .027. Meanwhile, there
were no group differences in the positive picture condition,
F5 1.46, p5 .24, h2p 5 .05, and, against our expectations,
neither were there in the trauma-related picture condition,
F5 2.26, p5 .11, h2p 5 .08.
For comparison, we repeated the 5 (Phase) 3 3 (Group)
repeated measures ANOVA for parietal alpha asymmetry
scores. This revealed a similar Phase 3 Group interaction, F
(8,204)5 2.83, e5 .71, p5 .014, h2p 5 .10. Follow-up
ANOVAs indicated that there only was a group difference in
the resting state, F(2,51)5 3.39, p5 .041, h2p 5 .12, but not
in any of the other phases, all ps> .54. In the resting state,
FIGURE 1 Valence (left panel) and arousal (right panel) levels during 1 week (average) and at three time points following intrusive memories. Error
bars indicate standard errors
FIGURE 2 Subjective responses to the trauma-related image in the emotion provocation task. Error bars indicate standard errors
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control participants had lower parietal asymmetry scores
than the PTSD group, while there were no differences among
the two trauma-exposed groups. Thus, the deviant resting
frontal asymmetry scores of the control group were also
reflected in parietal alpha asymmetry, whereas this was not
the case during the emotion induction phases. Importantly,
the two trauma-exposed groups did not differ in parietal
asymmetry, irrespective of measurement phase.
3.2.2 | Correlation analyses in trauma-
exposed participants
In line with the PTSD study by Rabe, Beauducel et al.
(2006), we assessed the correlations between symptoms and
frontal asymmetry scores based on the resting state measure-
ment, as well as using baseline-corrected activation asymme-
try scores during the emotion induction blocks. Because
FIGURE 3 Frontal asymmetry scores per group and condition. Asterisks indicate a significant simple effect of group. Error bars indicate standard
errors
TABLE 4 Correlations between frontal asymmetry scores and PTSD-related outcomes
Measure Resting Neutral Positive Negative Trauma
Correlations with retrospective measures (n5 38)
PCL score -.04 -.15 -.15 -.47* -.24
PSS-SR total -.06 -.26 -.24 -.53** -.25
Reexperiencing .12 -.42* -.29 -.54** -.39†
Avoidance -.14 -.14 -.11 -.42* -.11
Hyperarousal -.08 -.20 -.28 -.45* -.23
RIQ–Rumination .14 -.13 .10 -.14 -.14
RIQ–Negative appraisal .05 -.23 -.09 -.57** -.33
Correlations with diary outcomes (n5 38)
Intrusions total .08 -.33 -.14 -.37† -.32
Image intrusions .07 -.31 -.13 -.32 -.22
Thought intrusions .16 -.29 -.15 -.37† -.39†
Distress .02 -.35 -.04 -.34 -.34
Emotional intensity .20 -.42* -.16 -.45* -.49**
Physical reaction .19 -.25 -.31 -.43* -.35
Correlations with subjective responses to trauma-related image (n5 39)
Rumination -.03 -.23 .02 -.26 -.36†
Emotional intensity .41* -.32 -.22 -.33 -.50**
Physical reaction .23 -.11 .02 -.24 -.40*
Distress .28 -.13 .05 -.19 -.29
Note. Alpha was adjusted for multiple testing with 17 dependent variables and for the average correlation among the dependent variables (r5 .49). PCL5 PTSD
Checklist (Civilian version); PSS-SR5 PTSD Symptom Scale–Self-Report; RIQ5Response to Intrusions Questionnaire.
†p< .024 (a5 0.10). *p< .012 (a5 0.05). **p< .002 (a5 0.01).
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frontal asymmetry scores differed significantly during neutral
picture viewing between PTSD and no-PTSD participants,
we used resting-state frontal asymmetry scores as the base-
line condition. Thus, we subtracted resting state frontal
asymmetry scores from the asymmetries during neutral, posi-
tive, negative, and trauma-related picture viewing. The
derived scores reflect activation asymmetry, whereby higher
scores indicate stronger left-sided frontal activation (i.e.,
right-sided increase in alpha power) in response to picture
viewing. The direct linear associations between these scores
and PTSD symptom are summarized in Table 4. As can be
seen, relatively more left-sided activation in the negative
condition correlated with lower scores on all retrospective
PTSD scales (except for intrusion-related rumination). In the
trauma-related condition, trends indicate a more specific
association with reexperiencing symptoms, and left-sided
activation was significantly associated with lower emotional
intensity of intrusions and of the trauma-related image.
For comparison, we repeated the correlation analyses for
parietal asymmetry scores (see online supporting information
Table S3). Resting parietal asymmetry was not significantly
related to any of the outcomes, and there were no associations
with retrospective PTSD symptoms or diary outcomes. However,
correlations emerged between more left-sided parietal activation
during the emotion provocation task and rumination and negative
appraisal of intrusions, as well as with subjective rumination and
emotional intensity while viewing the trauma-related picture.
These findings suggest that the associations with PTSD symp-
toms and diary outcomes in Table 4 are specific to asymmetric
activation at frontal sites, while those with ruminative responses
to intrusions and emotional intensity of the trauma image are not.
3.2.3 | Valence and arousal responses to
intrusions
To explore whether frontal asymmetry scores were associated
with levels or time course of valence or arousal following an
intrusion, we performed repeated measures ANCOVAs with
time (3: immediate, 115 min, 130 min) as within-subject
factor, baseline valence or arousal levels as a covariate, and
frontal asymmetry scores as a covariate, focusing on potential
main or interaction effects involving frontal asymmetry. For
the valence analyses, there were no interaction effects with
resting or activation asymmetry scores from the emotion
provocation task, all Fs(2,48)< 0.70, ps> .45, h2ps< .03, and
no main effects, all Fs(1,24)< 1.93, ps> .18, h2ps< .07.
Also for arousal, there were no interaction effects, all Fs
(2,48)< 2.47, ps> .11, h2ps< .09, and no main effects, all Fs
(1,24)< 0.35, ps> .56, h2ps< .02, with the exception of acti-
vation asymmetry during neutral picture viewing, which
interacted with time, F(2,48)5 11.50, p< .001, h2p 5 .32.
Within-subject contrasts indicated that the interaction was
linear, F(1,24)5 16.58, p< .001, h2p 5 .41, which was fur-
ther supported by the finding that more left-sided activation
asymmetry during neutral picture viewing correlated with
higher arousal levels immediately following an intrusion, r
(27)5 .40, p5 .040, while there was no association after 15
min (r5 -.01, p5 .95), and a nonsignificant negative corre-
lation after 30 min (r5 -.23, p5 .24). Thus, overall, resting
frontal asymmetry appeared to have no link with affect levels
following intrusive memories, while we found only limited
and suggestive evidence that left-sided activation during the
emotion provocation task is associated with the postintrusion
time course of arousal levels.
3.2.4 | Uniqueness of the effects to PTSD
In order to test whether the associations between resting and
activation frontal asymmetries with PTSD symptoms are
shared with symptoms of anxiety, depression, and overall
psychopathology, we ran correlation analyses with STAI-T,
BDI-II, and BSI scores. As can be seen in Table 5, higher
left-sided frontal activation in the negative picture condition
again predicted lower levels of symptoms, while the effects
TABLE 5 Correlations with anxiety, depression, psychopathology, and current affect levels
Measure Resting Neutral Positive Negative Trauma
Correlations with psychopathology other than PTSD (n5 38)
STAI-T -.19 -.09 -.17 -.47** -.33†
BDI-II .12 -.15 -.10 -.52** -.20
BSI .05 -.13 -.28 -.53** -.30
Correlations with state negative affect prior to the resting state measurement (n5 39)
PANAS–NA .28 -.43* -.31† -.65** -.52**
Note. Alpha level was adjusted for multiple testing with four dependent variables and for the average correlation among dependent variables (r5 .68).
STAI5State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II5Beck Depression Inventory II; BSI5Brief Symptom Inventory; PANAS5 Positive and Negative Affect schedule,
State version.
†p< .064 (a5 0.10). *p< .032 (a5 0.05). **p< .006 (a5 0.01).
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in the trauma-related condition were similar in direction
but not statistically significant. Meanwhile, negative affect
levels prior to the EEG measurement were associated with
lower activation asymmetry scores throughout the emotion
induction task, and especially so in the negative picture
condition.
Based on these findings, it is possible that the associa-
tions described in Table 4 do not reflect effects that are
unique to PTSD, but in part reflect effects that are shared
with anxiety, depression, and other common symptoms of
psychopathology. To address this possibility, we performed
partial correlation analyses, correcting for STAI-T, BDI-II,
and BSI scores (including only participants with complete
data on all questionnaires). The results are summarized in
Table 6. As can be seen, several partial correlations were still
statistically significant and align with the zero-order correla-
tions. The effects for retrospective measures were reduced in
size and largely nonsignificant. In the intrusion diary, activa-
tion asymmetries in response to the neutral and the trauma-
related picture remained significant predictors of the
emotional intensity during intrusions. Consistent with this
finding, activation asymmetry scores in the trauma-related
condition also predicted lower emotional intensity ratings
directly after viewing the trauma-related picture.
3.2.5 | Symptom validity
Finally, we tested whether symptom overreporting tenden-
cies might have affected the results. Therefore, we applied a
conservative cutoff score for the SIMS and defined partici-
pants with a score higher than 16 as potentially displaying
overreporting tendencies (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003).
Based on this criterion, we excluded five participants, and
we also removed a sixth participant for whom no SIMS data
were available. We then repeated the main correlation analy-
ses that are reported in Table 4 in the remaining 32 partici-
pants. The results can be inspected in supporting information
Table S1. Strikingly, despite the considerable reduction in
statistical power, these analyses show that virtually all effects
of activation asymmetry during negative and trauma-related
picture viewing increase in size. Therefore, in this subsam-
ple, overall PTSD symptoms are highly correlated with acti-
vation asymmetry during negative picture viewing (PCL:
r5 -.55; PSS-SR: r5 -.60; ps .001), and also in the
trauma-related picture condition (PCL: r5 -.43; PSS-SR:
r5 -.41; ps .019). Moreover, left-sided frontal activation
in the trauma-related condition now correlated significantly
with fewer reexperiencing symptoms (r5 -.47) and intrusive
memories (r5 -.42). Thus, symptom overreporting
TABLE 6 Partial correlations (df5 33) with PTSD-related outcomes, corrected for trait anxiety (STAI-T), depression (BDI-II), and overall
psychopathology (BSI)
Measure Resting Neutral Positive Negative Trauma
Partial correlations with retrospective measures
PCL score -.13 -.06 .19 .06 .10
PSS-SR Total -.17 -.26 -.14 -.18 -.04
Reexperiencing .14 -.47* -.26 -.26 -.30
Avoidance -.27 -.05 .03 -.06 .13
Hyperarousal -.13 -.15 -.17 -.12 -.01
RIQ–Rumination -.09 -.06 .22 .14 -.06
RIQ–Negative appraisal .15 -.23 .01 -.31 -.21
Partial correlations with diary outcomes
Intrusions total .10 -.31 -.05 -.10 -.21
Image intrusions .08 -.28 -.05 -.08 -.10
Thought intrusions .21 -.26 -.02 -.05 -.29
Distress .06 -.35 -.04 -.09 -.29
Emotional intensity .30 -.43* -.18 -.25 -.47*
Physical reaction .23 -.22 -.33 -.28 -.29
Partial correlations with subjective responses to trauma-related image
Rumination -.10 -.23 .14 -.12 -.33
Emotional intensity .37 -.34 -.14 -.26 -.53**
Physical reaction .21 -.16 .08 -.16 -.41†
Distress .30 -.19 -.02 -.11 -.34
Note. Alpha was adjusted for multiple testing with 17 dependent variables and for the average correlation among the dependent variables (r5 .49). PCL5 PTSD
Checklist (Civilian version); PSS-SR5 PTSD Symptom Scale–Self-Report; RIQ5Response to Intrusions Questionnaire.
†p< .024 (a5 0.10). *p< .012 (a5 0.05). **p< .002 (a5 0.01).
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tendencies in some participants are highly unlikely to be
driving the effects of frontal asymmetry reported in this
paper, and might even have dampened true associations.
4 | DISCUSSION
The present study addressed frontal EEG asymmetry as a
potential marker of PTSD symptoms in trauma victims. Rep-
licating prior EEG studies in traumatized samples (for
review, see Meyer, Smeets et al., 2015), we explored the
association between PTSD symptoms and frontal asymmetry
at rest and in response to emotional provocation, including a
condition where participants viewed a trauma-related picture.
Our study extends prior findings by supplementing retro-
spective measures with ambulatory symptom assessment and
a laboratory provocation, providing a closer look at various
PTSD symptoms in daily life (Chun, 2016). A particular
interest was in reexperiencing symptoms, including intrusive
trauma memories and their ensuing cognitive-emotional reac-
tions. Moreover, we included measures of general psychopa-
thology and symptom exaggeration tendencies to assess
whether potential effects would be specific to PTSD and
robust against reporting bias.
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First,
our results replicate and extend prior findings (Rabe et al.,
2008; Rabe, Z€ollner, Maercker, & Karl, 2006) and support
the view that provocation-induced frontal activation asym-
metry is more closely linked with PTSD symptoms than
resting state asymmetry, which was unrelated to all retro-
spective symptoms. Second, higher left-sided frontal acti-
vation in response to a negative picture most consistently
predicted fewer PTSD symptoms, both assessed in the
intrusion diary, the emotion provocation task, and retro-
spectively. It was similarly associated with lower levels of
depression, anxiety, and general symptoms of psychopa-
thology, and partial correlation analyses correcting for
these factors revealed that these effects are likely to be
shared between PTSD and other mental disorders. Third,
left-sided frontal activation in response to an individually
chosen trauma-related picture did not show similarly con-
sistent associations with retrospective PTSD symptoms,
but was more specifically associated with fewer reexper-
iencing symptoms. Notably, it predicted less intense
responses to intrusions and in response to viewing the
trauma-related picture, even when corrected for other
symptoms of psychopathology and for symptom overre-
porting tendencies. However, valence and arousal levels
immediately following intrusions appeared to be unrelated
to this marker. Fourth, and more surprisingly, we also
found that activation asymmetry in response to a neutral
picture had similar relationships with various symptoms,
albeit less consistently across outcome measures. Finally,
group analyses that compared trauma survivors with and
without a diagnosis of PTSD with a healthy, trauma-free
control group revealed that trauma victims without PTSD
(i.e., relatively more resilient individuals) displayed more
left-sided frontal activation in response to the negative pic-
ture than victims with PTSD and controls. In line with the
correlation analyses, a similar pattern emerged for the neu-
tral picture condition, but, unexpectedly, not for the
trauma-related picture condition. Meanwhile, and contrary
to our expectation, controls had lower left-sided activity at
rest than the trauma-exposed groups.
In general, our results largely replicate Rabe, Beauducel
et al. (2006), who found that right-sided frontal activation in
response to a trauma picture was associated with PTSD
symptoms, depression, anxiety, and negative affect levels, in
trauma victims who had experienced a motor vehicle acci-
dent. Our results also align well with findings of increased
right-sided frontal activation during anxiety provocation in
individuals with social phobia (Davidson, Marshall, Tom-
arken, & Henriques, 2000) and panic disorder (Wiedemann
et al., 1999). We extend these prior findings by showing that
similar associations exist with PTSD reexperiencing symp-
toms in daily life, including the number and intensity of intru-
sive memories, in individuals with mixed traumatic
experiences. Moreover, by including the SIMS as a symptom
validity scale, we were able to demonstrate that the associa-
tions reported here are not carried by individuals with a tend-
ency toward symptom overreporting. Taken together, the
present findings suggest that frontal activation asymmetry dur-
ing emotional provocation can serve as a biomarker that is
informative about PTSD symptom levels, and also specifically
linked with the intensity of reexperiencing symptoms.
Unlike Rabe, Beauducel et al. (2006), we found frontal
activation asymmetry to correlate with PTSD symptoms
also in the negative picture condition, and to some degree
even in the neutral picture condition. Although we used the
same picture stimuli as Rabe and colleagues for the neutral,
positive, and negative emotion conditions, procedural dif-
ferences with their study may account for this disparity.
That is, these authors included only victims of motor vehi-
cle accidents, and therefore used the same trauma-related
picture for all participants. In contrast, we selected the
trauma-related picture individually using each participant’s
description of their index traumatic experience. Since par-
ticipants were fully aware of the type of stimuli that would
be presented, this may have led to stronger anticipatory
fear, knowing that they would be reminded of their perso-
nal traumatic experience. Arguably, this anticipation effect
might have exerted its influence most strongly in the neu-
tral picture condition. In other words, even though partici-
pants viewed a neutral picture, this condition appears
unlikely to have induced an affectively neutral state. This
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interpretation also aligns with the finding that the PTSD
group had lower frontal asymmetry scores than the no-
PTSD group during neutral picture viewing, while there
were no similar group or correlation effects for the resting
state or the positive picture condition.
It is also noteworthy that frontal activation asymmetry in
the negative picture condition was strongly associated with
almost all measures of PTSD symptoms, except for the acute
rumination, physical reactions, and distress caused by view-
ing the trauma-related image. Interestingly, analyses further
revealed that a large part of these associations are shared
with depression, anxiety, and general psychopathology, sug-
gesting that they do not reflect effects that are unique to
PTSD. In contrast, activation asymmetry during the trauma-
related image tended to be associated more specifically with
reexperiencing symptoms in daily life and in response to
viewing the image, and these effects tended to remain signif-
icant when corrected for other symptoms of psychopathol-
ogy. Therefore, our data suggest that frontal activation
asymmetry during emotion provocation can inform about a
wide range of psychopathological symptoms, whereas it can
also more specifically predict reexperiencing symptoms
when measured while participants view an idiosyncratic,
trauma-related picture.
From a theoretical point of view, it is noteworthy that
provocation-induced frontal asymmetries in the negative and
the trauma-related conditions were associated with
hyperarousal-related PTSD symptoms, including the emo-
tional intensity associated with traumatic memories. Some of
these effects were also evident in parietal alpha asymmetries.
Interestingly, the valence-arousal model of hemispheric asym-
metry (Heller et al., 1997; Nitschke et al., 1999) proposes that
anxious arousal is characterized by right parietal activation,
whereas frontal asymmetry would more specifically reflect
anxious apprehension. Accordingly, right-sided parietal activa-
tion patterns might play a role in the associations between
frontal asymmetry and hyperarousal symptoms. However, this
view is challenged by the finding that parietal asymmetries
were only linked with the emotional intensity in response to
viewing the trauma-related picture, and not with the emotional
intensity of intrusive memories. Furthermore, parietal asym-
metries were associated with ruminative responses and with
negative appraisal of intrusions. Taken together, our findings
provide only partial support for the valence-arousal model,
which warrants further critical investigation of the regional
specificity of asymmetry effects.
Another finding that may inspire future research is that
trauma-exposed participants with stronger left-sided frontal
activity at rest displayed more emotionally intense trau-
matic memories, and that left-sided activation asymmetry
during neutral picture viewing tended to correlate with
higher arousal levels immediately following an intrusion.
These results appear to contravene the overall pattern in
our results (i.e., left-sided frontal activity predicting fewer
PTSD symptoms), yet they align with the finding that left-
sided activity can be associated with both stronger and
weaker physiological downregulation of affective
responses (e.g., Meyer et al., 2014a). Indeed, both the left
and right hemispheres can be involved in increases and
decreases of autonomic nervous system and stress hormo-
nal responses (Kline, 2017; Miller, Crocker, Spielberg,
Infantolino, & Heller, 2013). Therefore, an explanation for
these unexpected findings may require a more fine-grained
analysis of neural and cognitive-emotional processes that
are captured by measurements of frontal alpha asymmetry.
The same is true for the finding that trauma-free controls
exhibited more right-sided frontal and parietal activity at
rest, which is at odds with prior findings (e.g., Rabe, Beau-
ducel et al., 2006). Indeed, in line with the capability
model of frontal asymmetry (Coan et al., 2006), these find-
ings underline that the resting state measurements (and our
“neutral” emotion condition) represent relatively uncon-
trolled experimental contexts. Future studies should thus
attempt to replace them by conditions that better control
individual or group differences on affective or motivational
dimensions.
Finally, our results suggest that frontal asymmetry may
be linked to reexperiencing symptoms, including intrusive
memories. The theoretical link between intrusions and mod-
els of frontal asymmetry still remains elusive, since intrusive
memories are typically thought to result from encoding, con-
solidation, or retrieval processes (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton,
& Burgess, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Rubin, Berntsen, &
Bohni, 2008) that make traumatic memories more or less
accessible (e.g., Bisby et al., 2010; Meyer, Krans, van Ast,
& Smeets, 2016; Meyer et al., 2013). However, it is possible
that the association between frontal asymmetry and intru-
sions is mediated by negative appraisal of intrusions, which
may result from stronger withdrawal tendencies and serve as
a maintaining factor of reexperiencing symptoms (Ehlers,
2010). More speculatively, direct associations could exist
between frontal asymmetry and intrusions; indeed, left fron-
tal activity has been proposed to be involved in the context-
dependent activation of memories through pathways to the
hippocampus (Kline, 2017; Meyer, Smeets et al., 2015).
Therefore, longitudinal (and/or experimental) studies are
required to establish the precise role of frontal asymmetry in
reexperiencing symptoms (also see Ehring, Kleim, & Ehlers,
2011).
The following methodological aspects should be kept in
mind when interpreting our findings. First, unlike Rabe,
Beauducel et al. (2006), we used resting state EEG as a base-
line for activation asymmetry scores rather than the neutral
condition, based on the observed group effects in frontal
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asymmetry (see Figure 3). Technically, this means that our
baseline condition differed from the emotional conditions in
recording length (8 min vs. 2 min). This ensures high reli-
ability and trait specificity of the baseline condition (Hage-
mann, 2004). At the same time, the emotion induction
periods lasted 2 min each (i.e., twice as long as in Rabe,
Beauducel et al., 2006), balancing the need for measurement
reliability with the possibility that asymmetric activations are
dynamic and short lived. Note, for instance, that shorter
recording periods have been associated with larger effects in
adults with anxiety or depression (Thibodeau et al., 2006). A
potential limitation of this approach is that baseline and emo-
tion induction phases had different instructional contexts,
with less control over motivational states during rest. There-
fore, it remains to be investigated whether our recording
parameters and conditions are optimal to detect effects
related to PTSD.
Second, we selected a trauma-related picture for each par-
ticipant individually. Therefore, it is possible that we were
more successful at activating traumatic memories for some
participants than for others, which may have introduced
unwanted variance and have overshadowed potential effects.
However, since PTSD is characterized by poor stimulus dis-
crimination and by a wide range of environmental stimuli
that can easily trigger reexperiencing symptoms (Ehlers &
Clark, 2000), it is likely that our emotion provocation task
was able to induce more trauma-specific reexperiencing
symptoms in those participants who also display more PTSD
symptoms in daily life. Moreover, on average, all trauma-
exposed individuals indicated that the picture strongly
reminded them of their own traumatic experience. Third, it
must be noted that we only used one stimulus for each emo-
tion category (e.g., a barking dog for negative emotions),
which limits the generalizability of our findings to the spe-
cific emotions that were induced. Relatedly, it is important to
keep in mind that the comparison among emotional condi-
tions was exploratory and still requires further replication.
Finally, replication is also warranted due to the limita-
tions imposed by our sample size. That is, we found several
relatively large effects in the r5 .41 to .57 range (which are
comparable to prior findings; e.g., Rabe, Beauducel et al.,
2006), while somewhat smaller effects may have gone unde-
tected due to limited statistical power (e.g., see the emerging
trends in Table 4). This argument is especially relevant for
our analyses on the time course of affect levels following
everyday intrusions, which only included a subset of the par-
ticipants. For ethical reasons, we allowed our participants to
omit the affect grids on the smartphone when this would be
experienced as too burdensome. As a result, the measured
responses might represent only relatively mild symptoms,
and we could use only a proportion of our participants in
these analyses. Thus, the question whether frontal asymmetry
might affect the time course of affective responding to
trauma memories remains to be investigated further in future
studies.
4.1 | Implications and conclusions
The present study aligns with an emerging consensus in the
literature that frontal asymmetry is especially informative
about individual differences in psychopathology when meas-
ured in response to an emotional provocation (Allen &
Reznik, 2015; Coan et al., 2006). Specifically, this implies
that future studies into the role of frontal asymmetry in
PTSD should include measurements during symptom provo-
cation. Furthermore, on a methodological level, our study
has demonstrated the benefits of including ambulatory meas-
ures to capture PTSD-specific reexperiencing symptoms, and
of including a scale that measures symptom overreporting
tendencies to ensure the validity of all other assessments.
Our findings suggest that state-dependent changes in fron-
tal asymmetry could eventually serve as a biological marker of
PTSD symptoms. While replication is still warranted, practical
implications can be envisioned. For instance, a next step would
be to investigate whether frontal activation asymmetry during
an emotional provocation may serve as a predictor of the
development of PTSD symptoms in individuals who have just
experienced a psychological trauma. Furthermore, research
should address the question of how the assessment of frontal
asymmetry can be optimized in such a way that it can be used
for diagnostic purposes, or to monitor treatment progress.
Furthermore, our results can inspire neuromodulation stud-
ies, where frontal activation asymmetry could be a promis-
ing target. For instance, in EEG neurofeedback, parameters
of ongoing brain activity are used as the basis for real-time
feedback to the participant, who can thereby learn to self-
regulate their own brain activity. Indeed, neurofeedback
has already been used to train frontal asymmetry at rest
(Allen, Harmon-Jones, & Cavender, 2001; Peeters, Ronner,
Bodar, van Os, & Lousberg, 2014; Quaedflieg et al., 2016).
Importantly, based on our results, it appears particularly
promising to apply neurofeedback for PTSD patients during
a symptom provocation condition (e.g., while viewing a
negative trauma-related picture), rather than at rest. Finally,
studying frontal activation asymmetry in response to symp-
tom provocation might also advance our theoretical under-
standing of PTSD (Meyer, Smeets et al., 2015). To this
end, it will be crucial to combine neuroimaging methods to
elucidate the neural underpinnings of asymmetric brain
activity during symptomatic states, for instance, by combin-
ing EEG with fMRI in varying motivational contexts (e.g.,
see Gorka, Phan, & Shankman, 2015). That way, models of
asymmetry can be updated and serve to inform neuropsy-
chological models of PTSD.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found in the
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